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Circling Descartes 
1.Introduction. 
 
From its initial, pre-publication circulation amongst a group of his contemporaries 
right up to the present day, Descartes’s Meditations has remained a highly 
controversial philosophical text. Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the text is 
whether a circular argument lies at its very heart – a circular argument which would, 
quite literally, destroy the very edifice of knowledge which Descartes had tried so 
hard to rebuild upon secure and solid foundations. In this paper I want to have another 
look at the Cartesian Circle and to argue that, for all the undoubted ingenuity of 
Descartes’s various responses to the issue, a damaging circle remains in place and, 
moreover, I shall argue, it is a circle which outruns Descartes’s standard resources for 
responding to the charge of circularity. 
 
First a little scene-setting. One illuminating way of reading Descartes’s Meditations is 
to see the text as incorporating the key elements of Descartes’s responses to a range of 
issues which were in the air at the beginning of the 17th C, including his response to 
scepticism. The sceptical challenge, as it presented itself to Descartes, may be seen as 
a two-part challenge thrown down by those like Montaigne with whose work 
Descartes was familiar. The two parts of that challenge were:(i) to defeat scepticism a 
philosopher must be able to come up with at least one claim which lies beyond all 
doubt, a claim which can withstand the vast array of sceptical arguments which 
Montaigne set out in his Apology and elsewhere, a claim which must be sceptic-proof; 
and (ii) the philosopher must be able to reveal the criterion of truth and certainty 
which gives such a secure epistemic status to that allegedly sceptic-proof claim. 
Montaigne thought it unlikely that one could meet the first part of this challenge and 
was quite sure that, even if the first part could be met, the second part would then 
come into play and show that all attempts to defeat scepticism are, in the end, either 
infinitely regressive or circular.1
 
Descartes set out to meet the first part of Montaigne’s challenge in Meditations 1  and 
2. In Meditation 1 he famously set out a series of sceptical challenges to the many 
sorts of knowledge claims we make, concluding that ‘there is not one of my former 
beliefs about which a doubt may not properly be raised; and this is not a flippant or 
ill-considered conclusion, but is based on powerful and well thought-out reasons.’2 In 
Meditation 2 he completed his answer to part one of Montaigne’s challenge when he 
claimed that ‘after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude 
that this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me 
or conceived in my mind.’3 Though the phrase Cogito ergo sum does not appear in 
the text of the Meditations, the passage just cited is generally seen as one of many 
‘Cogito passages’ in Descartes’s work and it is treated by Descartes in his various 
replies to objections as on all fours with the famous Latin tag. Thus Descartes saw the 
Cogito as providing his first sure and certain proposition and as providing him – and 
indeed any other conscientious meditator – with an answer to the first part of 
Montaigne’s challenge. 
 
In Meditation 3 Descartes turned his attention to the second part of Montaigne’s 
challenge i.e. he squared up to the task of revealing the Cogito’s criterion of truth and 
certainty in a way which, he hoped, would not push him into any circular 
argumentation. Descartes tried to achieve this goal by suggesting that the criterion can 
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literally be ‘read off’ from the Cogito by anyone who paid close and careful attention 
to it. Such an attentive inquirer would just ‘see’ what that criterion is, it would leap 
out from the Cogito itself. Thus Descartes saw the criterion as already contained 
within the Cogito and not as the sort of separate and independent claim which 
underpinned Montaigne’s view that all such enterprises are bound to end in 
circularity. Descartes wrote: ‘In this first item of knowledge there is simply a clear 
and distinct perception of what I am asserting’ and he went on to say ‘I now seem 
able to lay it down as a general rule that whatever I perceive very clearly and 
distinctly is true.’ 4  
 
By presenting his criterion in this manner Descartes thought he was pulling off a 
masterstroke in the battle against scepticism. Not only had he extracted his initial 
truth, the Cogito, from the very arguments of the sceptics themselves, but he had now 
revealed his criterion of clarity and distinctness (henceforth C+D) as already 
contained within that initial truth. His answer to the second part of Montaigne’s 
challenge was now in place: he had a criterion available to him, a criterion which did 
not seem likely to push him into any circular argumentation. 
 
With the answers to both parts of Montaigne’s challenge now in place we would 
confidently have expected that Descartes would now get down to the exciting 
business of rebuilding the edifice of knowledge on secure foundations, and that he 
would henceforth simply deploy his C+D criterion in order to make substantial 
philosophical progress. The sceptic had been defeated, the first certainty had been 
found, the criterion of truth and certainty had been revealed – so surely it would be 
downhill all the way from here. At least that’s what one might have expected. But, of 
course, that is not what happened!  
 
2. Two preliminary worries. 
 
However, trouble was already brewing in the very passage in which the criterion was 
stated. Note what Descartes said in that passage, paying particular attention to the 
words I have placed in italics: ‘In this first item of knowledge there is simply a clear 
and distinct perception of what I am asserting; this would not be enough to make me 
certain of the truth of the matter if it could ever turn out that something which I 
perceived with such clarity and distinctness was false. So I now seem to be able to lay 
it down as a general rule that whatever I perceive very clearly and distinctly is true’.5
 
The occurrence of the word ‘seem’ at this point signals a certain hesitancy on 
Descartes’s part in advancing the criterion. The same hesitancy is expressed in 
another manner in his statement of the C+D criterion in the Discourse. There what he 
said was (again I have added the italics): ‘So I decided that I could take it as a general 
rule that the things we conceive very clearly and very distinctly are all true; only there 
is some difficulty in recognising which are the things that we distinctly conceive.’6 So 
though Descartes went on to assert the criterion in both places we can already detect 
that he had some niggling worries in the back of his mind.  
 
One of those worries emerges more fully if we now turn to the second italicised 
passage in the statement of the C+D criterion in Meditation 3:  ‘this would not be 
enough to make me certain of the truth of the matter if it could ever turn out that 
something which I perceived with such clarity and distinctness was false’. 
 2
What this suggests is that if it could happen that the meditator clearly and distinctly 
perceived X and X turned out to be false, then obviously C+D perception could not be 
advanced as a criterion of truth. Further, given Descartes’s well known comments 
about treating the doubtful as if it were false, we may legitimately gloss this by saying 
that the passage also suggests that if the meditator clearly and distinctly perceived Y 
and Y turned out to be subject to doubt, then, C+D perception could not be advanced 
as a criterion of certainty.7 Now look at what Descartes wrote in the very next 
sentence of Meditation 3: ‘Yet I previously accepted as wholly certain and evident 
many things which I afterwards realised were doubtful. What were these? The earth, 
sky, stars, and everything else that I apprehended with the senses.’8  In other words 
Descartes now seems to be offering for our consideration a list of items which he once 
took to be C+D, but which he now knows, on foot of the sceptical arguments of 
Meditation 1, were all either false or, at the very least subject to doubt.9 So is the 
criterion already dead in the water within two sentences of its announcement?  
 
Fortunately for Descartes the answer is no. He went on in the third paragraph of 
Meditation 3 to distinguish between his cognitive access to the ideas of the earth, the 
sky and the stars and his cognitive access to items allegedly corresponding to those 
ideas and represented by them as existing in reality. Descartes made the point that had 
he confined himself to claims only about the content of the ideas involved, then the 
C+D status of such claims would have remained intact, it was only the more extensive 
claims about the alleged real existence of items beyond our ideas which caused 
trouble. He wrote: “Here was my mistake”.10 So Descartes had an answer to this first 
worry: we can be sure about the content of our ideas, but, at least at this early stage, 
we have no entitlement to make claims about the representational dimensions of those 
ideas. Let’s call this ‘the representational answer’. 
 
However in paragraph four of Meditation 3 he went on to express some more 
worrying thoughts about his new found criterion and it is these thoughts, and his 
response to them, which lead to the problem of the circle. He wrote: ‘But what about 
when I was considering something very simple and straightforward in arithmetic or 
geometry, for example that two and three added together make five, and so on? Did I 
not see at least these things clearly enough to affirm their truth?’ The answer one 
would expect is, ‘yes’, he did see those things clearly and distinctly and surely they 
must rank amongst the items which are beyond doubt, items which are certainly true. 
 
But at this point Descartes recalled that back in the sceptical onslaught of Meditation 
1 he had made use of the hypothesis of a deceptive God (henceforth DG) or an Evil 
Demon (henceforth ED) in order to push the sceptical case further than even the 
sceptics themselves had done.11 In setting out that ploy, he had first considered the 
possibility that a DG might do the trick, but, for a variety of reasons, he had second 
thoughts about such a use of God. However, before setting the DG version of the 
hypothesis aside, he had suggested that such a DG could raise the possibility of doubt 
about even the most secure truths we think we have i.e. simple mathematical truths - 
and he specifically mentioned the claim that 2+3=5.12  Descartes’s thought was that 
such a DG could have so created him that he (Descartes) would take it that all kinds 
of things exist or are true even though they do not exist at all or are not true. Later 
when he replaced talk of a DG with the ED version of the hypothesis, the natural 
assumption is that the ED would have the power or capacity to so pervert our faculties 
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that the same range of truths would still be liable to doubt – including the claim that 
2+3=5.13
 
Now in Meditation 3, when he remembered what he had previously written, Descartes 
began to worry a little more about the C+D criterion which he had just revealed to us. 
He wrote: ‘Indeed, the only reason for my later judgement that they…(i.e. simple 
mathematical truths like 2+3=5)… were open to doubt was that it occurred to me that 
perhaps some God could have given me a nature such that I was deceived even in 
matters which seemed most evident. And whenever my preconceived belief in the 
supreme power of God comes to mind, I cannot but admit that it would be easy for 
him, if he so desired, to bring it about that I go wrong even in those matters which I 
think I see utterly clearly with my mind's eye.’14  
 
So here we have a second, and more interesting, example of an item which Descartes 
had once taken to be C+D (i.e. 2+3=5) but which could be rendered doubtful once we 
put the DG or ED hypothesis in place. Here ‘the representational answer’ seems of no 
use because it is implausible to suggest that the mistake Descartes might have made in 
the 2+3=5 case was that he went beyond the content of the ideas involved and also 
took himself to be sure and certain about some items in reality which those ideas were 
representing to him. When we think about 2+3=5 we do not think of them as 
representing items out there in reality – that is not the kind of mistake we ever make 
in such a case. So Descartes cannot get himself off the hook in this case by rehearsing 
a version of ‘the representational answer’ tailored to meet the problems now being 
posed by the case of 2+3=5’. Descartes recognises this and his response leads directly 
to the issues which give rise to the problem of the circle. He wrote: 
 
‘Yet when I turn to the things themselves which I think I perceive very clearly, I am 
so convinced by them that I spontaneously declare: let whoever can do so deceive me, 
he will never bring it about that I am nothing, so long as I continue to think I am 
something; or make it true at some future time that I have never existed, since it is 
now true that I exist; or even that that two and three added together are more or less 
than five, or anything of this kind in which I see a manifest contradiction. And since I 
have no cause to think that there is a deceiving God, and I do not yet even know for 
sure whether there is a God at all, any reason for doubt which depends simply on this 
supposition is a very slight and, so to speak, metaphysical one.’15
 
Note that if we put this passage together with the earlier passages from paragraph four 
of Meditation 3 we can see that Descartes was making intriguing use of a distinction 
between those occasions upon which he was paying direct attention to the claim that 
2+3=5 and those occasions upon which the thought of the DG/ED came into his head 
and distracted his attention. He was suggesting that in the former case he could see no 
reason for any sort of doubt about claims like 2+3=5, whereas in the latter case, he 
conceded that doubts did indeed come into his mind. This is a point I will return to 
later and it is important to note that Descartes made use of that distinction in 
paragraph four of Meditation 3. 
 
However, Descartes did concede that there is at any rate a ‘slight…metaphysical’ 
doubt left in place and he declared what his strategy for removing that slight doubt 
was going to be: ‘…in order to remove even this slight reason for doubt…I must 
examine whether there is a God, and, if there is, whether he can be a deceiver. For if I 
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do not know this, it seems that I can never be quite certain about anything else.’16 So 
to put an end to his remaining worries about the C+D criterion and its viability, 
Descartes undertook to prove that God exists and is not a deceiver. His thought was 
that with a non-deceptive God in place the power and epistemic status of the DG/ED 
hypothesis would be removed – the good God would, quite literally, trump the evil 
demon. His criterion would then be vindicated and the enterprise of reconstructing the 
edifice of knowledge would be back on track.17
 
3. The Circle emerges: 
 
Descartes went on in Meditation 3 to offer a proof of the existence of such a non- 
deceptive God and then, in Meditations 4,5 and 6 he made use of this non-deceptive 
God to explain human error and to vindicate many of those cognitive claims which 
had been in abeyance since the sceptical onslaught of Meditation 1. This non-
deceptive God is, thus, of great importance to Descartes’s overall project and hence 
any problems which arise about Descartes’s entitlement to such a God place the 
whole enterprise in jeopardy: hence the importance of the accusation of circularity. So 
how exactly does that accusation arise? 
 
In the course of his proof of God in Meditation 3, Descartes made use of a fascinating 
premise – a premise which played a vital role in securing the success of the proof – a 
premise John Cottingham has aptly named ‘The Causal Adequacy Principle’ 
(henceforth CAP). That premise runs as follows: ‘there must at least be as much 
(reality) in the efficient and total cause as in the effect of that cause’.18 This is an 
interesting and substantive premise, but what is even more interesting is what 
Descartes had to say about the nature and status of our cognitive access to it. Just 
before the CAP occurs Descartes said: ‘it is manifest by the natural light’19 In other 
words, Descartes took it that we know the CAP by ‘the natural light’. Now if we ask 
what exactly that means, the answer which emerges is that the CAP is C+D perceived 
by the meditator. In other words the expression ‘the natural light’ is one which 
Descartes used to catch what he otherwise expressed by using the language of clarity 
and distinctness: to know X by ‘the natural light’ is to C+D perceive X.20
 
Now we have all the materials of the circle before us. Descartes has attempted to 
remove the ‘slight metaphysical doubt’ hanging over his C+D criterion by proving the 
existence of a good, non-deceptive God. However, in the course of that proof a vital 
premises, the CAP, is explicitly said by Descartes to be known by clear and distinct 
perception i.e. a vital premises in the proof is said to be itself a piece of C+D 
perception. The immediate thought which presents itself is this: if the proof of God 
was intended in some way to vindicate the C+D criterion, isn’t there something fishy 
about appealing, in the course of that very proof, to a premise whose epistemic basis 
turns out to be C+D perception. It all looks rather circular doesn’t it? And, indeed, 
that is how the movement of thought involved struck several of those who read the 
Meditations prior to its first publication. The objection that a circular argument is 
involved turns up in the set of objections to the Meditations collected by Mersenne, 
and it also, and more famously, turns up in the set of objections which were put 
together by Antoine Arnauld, one of Descartes’s most celebrated contemporaries. It is 
customary to cite Arnauld’s version of the objection as he puts the matter most 
succinctly – he writes: ‘I have one further worry, namely how the author avoids 
reasoning in a circle when he says that we are sure that what we clearly and distinctly 
 5
perceive is true only because God exists. But we can be sure that God exists only 
because we clearly and distinctly perceive this. Hence, before we can be sure that God 
exists, we ought to be able to be sure that whatever we perceive clearly and evidently 
is true.’21
 
The circularity charge is now standardly presented in a manner suggested by Willis 
Doney.22 Let p stand for the proposition ‘God exists and is not a deceiver’ and let q 
stand for the proposition ‘whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive is true’. We can 
then present the nub Arnauld’s objection as follows: 
 
Descartes seems committed to holding both: 
 
(1) I can know that p only if I first know that q 
 
and  
 
(2) I can know that q only if I first know that p. 
 
Presented in this way Descartes’s argumentation seems clearly circular, so much so 
that one might wonder how a celebrated philosopher like Descartes could ever have 
failed to notice the circular reasoning involved. The answer is, perhaps, that Descartes 
did not think his argumentation circular at all! 
 
4. Descartes’s response to the circle objection: 
 
Confronted with the objection Descartes responded with one of the neatest pieces of 
philosophical footwork in the history of the discipline. He suggested that to make 
sense of what he was trying to say, and to see that there is no circle involved, we need 
to notice that we can take talk of C+D perception in two different ways. (a) Talk of 
C+D perception can refer to those occasions upon which a person is actually directly 
attending to the item which is said to be clearly and distinctly perceived. Thus when I 
am actually paying careful and deliberate attention to the claim that 2+3=5, then I 
may be said to be clearly and distinctly perceiving that 2+3=5. Descartes referred to 
this sort of C+D in the reply to Arnauld as ‘what we in fact perceive clearly’23 Let’s 
call this first sort of clear and distinct perception C+D1.  
 
However, there is a second sense in which we may talk of clearly and distinctly 
perceiving something. (b) In this second sense when we talk of C+D perception we 
are talking about having clearly and distinctly perceived something at some time in 
the past, but we are no longer actually paying direct attention to it. Thus, suppose that 
yesterday I C+D perceived the claim that 2+3=5, and was then paying direct attention 
to it, but now I am using that claim as one ingredient in a wider mathematical setting, 
and I’m no longer explicitly attending to it, then it is proper to talk of C+D in this 
second sense. Descartes characterised this as ‘what we remember having perceived 
clearly on a previous occasion.’24 Let’s call it C+D2. 
 
Then comes the masterstroke. Descartes suggests that the guarantee of God provided 
by the proof is needed only to back up C+D2 – it was never his intention to see C+D1 
as requiring divine support. Moreover, in the process of arguing for the existence of 
God in Meditation 3 the only sort of C+D involved is C+D1, so there is no circle. His 
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clearest statement of the central point here is in the reply to Mersenne’s version of the 
objection: ‘when I said that we can know nothing for certain until we are aware that 
God exists, I expressly declared that I was speaking only of knowledge of those 
conclusions which can be recalled when we are no longer attending to the arguments 
by means of which we deduced them.’25
 
If we now set out Doney’s formula for capturing the circularity charge, but 
incorporate into it Descartes’s distinction between C+D1 and C+D2, we can see that 
the original, very obvious circularity is removed at a stroke. When we do this the 
result is: 
 
Descartes is committed to both: 
 
(1) I can only know that God exists and is not a deceiver, if I first know that 
whatever I C+D1 is true. 
 
      and  
 
(2) I can only know that whatever I C+D2 is true, if I first know that God exists 
and is not a deceiver. 
 
There is no obvious circularity involved here as in each case the sort of C+D referred 
to is different. Circularity would only be present if both (1) and (2) contained 
references to C+D1, or if both contained references to C+D2. That is not what they 
contain, so things are looking up for Descartes – he seems to have found a way of 
expressing the nub of the issue without any obvious circularity emerging. So is 
Descartes off the hook then? Is the project or rebuilding the edifice of knowledge now 
back on track with a vindicated criterion of C+D perception firmly in place? Has the 
sting finally been taken out of the DG/ED hypothesis?  
 
Before directly responding to those questions let’s first see whether the response 
Descartes made is a plausible one in the light of what he actually had to say in 
Meditation 3 – in other words is it plausible for Descartes to suggest that the 
distinction between the two sorts of C+D was in place in his treatment of the issues of 
God and the criterion in Meditation 3.  In my view, Descartes’s move does have firm 
roots in what he had to say at that point and indeed, elsewhere. To see that this is so 
let’s look again at the key passage in paragraph four of Meditation 3 which is central 
to the whole debate: 
 
‘…(i) whenever my preconceived belief in the supreme power of God comes to mind, 
I cannot but admit that it would be easy for him, if he so desired, to bring it about that 
I go wrong even in those matters which I think I see utterly clearly with my mind's 
eye. (ii)Yet when I turn to the things themselves which I think I perceive very clearly, 
I am so convinced by them that I spontaneously declare: let whoever can do so 
deceive me, he will never bring it about that I am nothing, so long as I continue to 
think I am something; or make it true at some future time that I have never existed, 
since it is now true that I exist; or even that two and three added together are more or 
less than five…’26
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The passage numbered (ii) is clearly suggestive of C+D1 i.e. of the sort of C+D 
perception which is involved when a person is paying direct attention to what is being 
perceived. The passage numbered (i) suggests that it is only when a person’s attention 
is taken away from the direct perception of some item that a doubt about it arises. 
This suggests that it is cases of C+D2 which are involved. The passage also suggests 
that no additional epistemic support is needed for C+D1 perceptions, whereas C+D2 
perceptions clearly need additional support of some sort and that is what the proof of 
God supplies. Now if this strategy is what Descartes had in mind, then he can be said 
to have opted for what some modern commentators have called the ‘criterion-not- 
needed strategy’ or the ‘antecedent exemption’ strategy in responding to the circle. 
The expression ‘criterion-not-needed’ indicates that Descartes held the view that the 
general C+D rule (C+D2 ) does not need to be available during the execution of the 
proof of God’s existence. The reference to ‘antecedent exemption’ indicates the view 
that there were some pieces of C+D (i.e. the C+D1s) which Descartes always thought 
of as exempt from the doubting strategy.27  
 
Further support for the view that Descartes was working with a C+D1/C+D2 
distinction and that, in particular he seems to have taken C+D1s as exempt from 
doubt, can be had by looking at the famous ‘atheist’ passage in Descartes’s reply to 
Mersenne’s version of the circle objection. There Descartes wrote: ‘The fact that an 
atheist can be “clearly aware that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right 
angles” is something I do not dispute. But I maintain that this awareness of his is not 
true knowledge, since no act of awareness that can be rendered doubtful seems fit to 
be called knowledge. Now since we are supposing that this individual is an atheist, he 
cannot be certain that he is not being deceived on matters which seem to him to be 
very evident (as I fully explained). And although this doubt may not occur to him, it 
can still crop up if someone else raises the point or if he looks into the matter himself. 
So he will never be free of this doubt until he acknowledges that God exists.’28
 
Note that Descartes concedes that the atheist can have occurrent, or here and now, 
knowledge about triangles (since, presumably he is attending to the issues involved) 
but, because he hasn’t got a non-deceptive God in his scheme of things, he cannot 
have secure knowledge over time on such issues. Thus the atheist can have C+D 1 in 
such cases, but can never have C+D2. 
 
Further support for elements of Descartes’s view on these matters can be derived from 
two other sources. (1) One of Descartes’s correspondents, Regius, wondered whether 
Descartes held the view that the truth of the axioms used in the proof of God was self-
evident. Descartes replied as follows: ‘This, I agree, is true, during the time they are 
clearly and distinctly understood, for our mind is of such a nature that it cannot help 
assenting to what it clearly understands.’29 This passage clearly suggests that such 
axioms are exempt from doubt – as long as we are attending to them: i.e. they are 
C+D1. 
  
(2) Later, in his exchanges with Burman on the issue of clarity, distinctness and God 
Descartes has this to say: ‘If we did not know that all truth has its origin in God, then 
however clear our ideas were, we would not know that they were true, or that we were 
not mistaken – I mean, of course, when we were not paying attention to them, and 
when we remembered that we had clearly and distinctly perceived them. For, on other 
occasions, when we do pay attention to the truths themselves, even though we may not 
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know God exists, we cannot be in any doubt about them. Otherwise, we could not 
prove that God exists.’30
 
Together with the key passage from Meditation 3, these passages show that Descartes 
did indeed work with a C+D1/C+D2 distinction elsewhere as well as explicitly stating 
such a distinction in his replies to the objections. Moreover, they also show that he 
frequently explicitly asserted versions of the ‘antecedent exemption view’ i.e. the 
view that the category of C+D1s was always exempt from doubt.  
 
Thus, at the core of Descartes’s response to the circle objection there lies the 
distinction itself and the antecedent exemption view of C+D1s. So does that strategy 
work as well as Descartes thought it did?31
 
5. Problems with Descartes’s strategy and the re-emergence of circularity: 
 
I think at least two sorts of problems arise in connection with Descartes’s strategy 
and, while the first may not be fatal to it, the second, in my opinion is. I will look at 
each in turn. 
 
(A)A worry about CAP and the exemption strategy: 
 
Though the exemption strategy suggests that Descartes never harboured any real 
worries about the status of simple claims such as 2+3=5, nevertheless the sceptical 
argumentation in Meditation 1, as well as the vacillitations in Meditation 3, suggest 
that things were never quite as simple and straightforward as that. As I have already 
noted, he does seem to use the DG/ED hypothesis in Meditation 1 to raise the 
possibility of doubts about 2+3=5, and in Meditation 3 the words I altered in the CSM 
text to read ‘or even that’ suggest at least some slight hesitation about declaring that 
the claim that 2+3=5 has the same epistemic standing as the Cogito.32 This message is 
also carried, I think, by the occurrence of the word ‘else’ at the end of paragraph four 
of Meditation 3.33 As I read this passage it would not be unreasonable to take it that 
Descartes is suggesting that, until the proof of God is in place, he cannot know with 
certainty anything other than the Cogito. 
 
Now the general drift of the exemption strategy conflicts with this reading of 
Descartes. That strategy suggests that in addition to the Cogito, simple claims such as 
2+3=5 must also be seen as exempt from doubt – at least when we are directly 
attending to them. According to the exemption strategists unless this is recognised 
there is no hope for Descartes. John Cottingham captures this very nicely: ‘If 
Descartes is indeed introducing doubt about whether I can know the truth of such a 
simple proposition as “two plus three is five” at the time when I am intuiting it, there 
can be no hope of setting up the axioms needed to prove God’s existence. The circle 
will indeed be insoluble…’34  
 
 
However, I do not want to push the issue of the exemption strategy regarding the 
simple claim that 2+3=5, rather what I want to do is to focus on the suggestion, 
crucial to the proof of God, that exemption also extends to the CAP. As I noted at the 
time of its introduction, the CAP is an important and substantive principle which 
plays a pivotal role in the proof of God in Meditation 3. Descartes, in announcing the 
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principle, asserted that it was known by ‘the light of nature’ and, as we have seen, 
such talk in Descartes amounts to the claim that we have a C+D perception of the 
CAP. Now given the role the CAP plays in the proof and given Descartes’s claim that 
the only sort of C+D which turns up in the proof is C+D1, we must take it that he 
regarded the CAP as having C+D1 status in the proof: that is he must have regarded 
the CAP as a truth about which a person could not entertain any doubts at least for as 
long as they were attending to it. 
 
But does that not seem an implausible claim? Whatever chance we might have of 
getting general agreement that a claim like 2+3=5 is C+D1 (while we are attending to 
it), I do not think that we could be at all so sure that we could get such agreement on a 
complex claim like the CAP.  Surely there is a world of difference between simple 
claims like 2+3=5 and complex claims like the CAP, and surely it is implausible to 
see the antecedent exemption as extending to the CAP without further ado. As we 
have seen, Descartes thought that our minds were so constructed that when directly 
confronted by a piece of C+D1 ‘they cannot but admit what they distinctly 
conceive’.35 But his own friend and associate, Mersenne, was not convinced that the 
CAP was as clear and evident as Descartes thought: his mind when confronted with it 
was not ‘forced to admit’ it.36 Now it would, of course, be open to Descartes to 
respond that Mersenne, and indeed others who harboured doubts about the C+D1 
status of the CAP were simply not sufficiently careful in their cognitive access to that 
principle – and, perhaps, there is something to be said for that response. However, the 
objection might still be pressed that whatever about the obvious C+D1 status of 
2+3=5, there is at least room for argument about the status of the CAP – and, of 
course, it is CAP and not 2+3=5 which Descartes needs to carry off the proof. 
 
So let me sum up my first objection to Descartes’s response to the circle. It has two 
parts: (i) either Descartes has lingering doubts about the C+D status of 2+3=5 and 
they extend to the CAP or (ii) he sticks to his guns and exempts 2+3=5, but cannot 
plausibly extend that exemption to the CAP. In either case he would not be entitled to 
the level of C+D which the CAP must have in the proof, and, thus, in both cases the 
proof collapses and with it Descartes whole enterprise. 
 
(B) Even if we grant exemption to the CAP a fatal circle remains in place: 
 
My second objection to Descartes’s response to the circle objection is designed to 
work even if we grant that the exemption strategy extends to the CAP while we are 
directly attending to it. 
 
To see why I have this worry let’s look again at just what Descartes had in mind when 
he said that a claim has C+D1 status. In order to avoid the objection that I am 
imposing a view on Descartes, let’s look at exactly what he wrote when he addressed 
this issue. In his 1640 letter to Regius he had explicitly marked out what I have called 
C+D1 claims by saying that we could be sure they were true ‘during the time they are 
clearly and distinctly understood’, and in his reply to Mersenne’s version of the 
circularity charge he suggested that what I have called C+D2 claims arise when we are 
‘no longer attending…to’ the claims involved - so presumably a claim has C+D1 
status when we are attending to it. This is confirmed by what he had to say to Burman 
where he characterised the claims I have called C+D1 claims by saying that a person 
can be sure of such claims ‘for so long as he does pay attention to them.’37  Thus the 
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key difference, in Descartes’s view, between C+D1 and C+D2 perceptions is that in 
the former the knower is explicitly and directly paying attention to the item said to be 
C+D perceived, whereas in the latter the person is no longer paying explicit and direct 
attention to the item said to be C+D perceived. To emphasise the point: if a C+D item 
is not being explicitly attended to then the status it has is C+D2. 
 
Now recall Descartes’s strategy: with the C+D1/C+D2 distinction in place he argues 
that there is no circle because the proof of God contains only pieces of C+D1 and it is 
only C+D2s which require divine support. Let’s now look once again at his execution 
of the strategy – this time giving him the benefit of the doubt and allowing that the 
CAP is indeed C+D1 while it is being explicitly and directly attended to. 
 
Now we might suggest a reconstruction of Descartes’s proof of God in Meditation 3 
along the follow lines: 
 
(i) Amongst my ideas is an idea of a perfect God.  
 
(ii) The CAP: ‘it is evident by the light of nature (i.e. clear and distinct) that, at the 
very least, there must be as much (reality) in the total efficient cause as there is in the 
effect of that same cause” [A principle Descartes claims applies as much to the causal 
account of ideas as it does to items like stones—see Principles 1,17.38 - in talking 
about the causes of ideas he tends to say that there must be as much ‘formal’ (i.e. 
actual) reality in the cause of the idea as there is ‘objective’ (i.e. reality  as 
represented) in the idea.] 
   
(iii) I am an imperfect being (evidence? I doubt, err etc) and so (by (ii)) cannot be the 
adequate cause of a perfect idea like that of God. I do not possess sufficient ‘formal’ 
or actual reality to cause the ‘objective reality’ of a perfect God as represented in my 
idea of God. (Neither can any chain of imperfect causes be the cause of the idea of 
God) 
 
(iv) But, also by (ii), my idea of God in (i) must have an adequate cause (i.e. there 
must be a cause of that idea which has the appropriate level of ‘formal’ or actual 
reality) - it cannot have come from nothing, nor can it have come from any lesser 
cause.  
 
(v) Therefore, my idea of God must have as its cause a perfect being (God): so God 
must exist.  
 
Notice that the CAP turns up in the second step in this argument and is then used 
throughout the argument in order to facilitate the emergence of the conclusion that 
God exists at step five. It is widely accepted that Descartes’s proof is complex, 
difficult and controversial, so that the movement of thought from the first step to the 
conclusion is not quite as simple and straightforward as the schematic presentation 
suggests. 
 
Let’s now grant that when it turns up in step two of the argument the CAP is being 
directly and explicitly attended to and has the exempt C+D1 status which Descartes 
requires. If we grant that, we can say, at this stage, that Descartes is only using the 
sort of C+D in the proof which his strategy requires i.e. C+D1. 
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However, now think of Descartes at step four of the argument where he is, 
presumably, no longer paying the explicit and direct attention to CAP which secured 
the C+D1 status for it back at step two. At step four he is remembering that he C+D 
perceived the CAP back in step two, and he is now relying on it and using it to make 
an additional argumentative move  – he is no longer explicitly and directly attending 
to the CAP itself. If that is so, then at step four of the argument the status of the CAP 
has surely shifted from the C+D1 category to the C+D2 category so it follows that, in 
the course of the proof itself, Descartes is actually making use at the C+D2 level of a 
crucial philosophical principle. But has he not all along conceded that the use of 
C+D2s does require the guarantee of God and, at step four, God is not yet available to 
him. God only becomes available at step five – and, indeed, if my criticism holds, 
Descartes is not entitled to move to step five at all, so he never actually gets God into 
the picture. The circle is back in play: God is needed to vindicate reliance on C+D2s 
yet a C+D2 has now turned up inside the proof at step four. Since the proof depends 
on that step, it thus depends on something which is not available until after the proof 
has been completed. The proof thus self-destructs and Descartes’s whole epistemic 
project implodes. 
 
Notice the significance of this result. In response to the original charge of circularity 
Descartes had produced the C+D1/C+D2 distinction and had used it to show that there 
was no circle involved. His strategy turned crucially on the claim that while God was 
needed to vindicate the C+D2s, only C+D1s turned up in the proof of God. My claim 
is that because a C+D2 does turn up in the proof not only does the proof fail and the 
circle remerge, but this time the C+D1/C+D2 distinction upon which his standard 
responses rely is of no use. That strategy is already in place and has given rise to this 
new version of the circle. 
 
Some will, no doubt, object that I am being captious in taking this view of the way in 
which the CAP moves from being a C+D1 at step two to being a C+D2 at step four. 
Surely, it will be argued, this is an extravagant claim to make about the steps in an 
argument of this sort. I don’t think so and, I think, Descartes is not entitled to that 
reply either. In the Rules for the Direction of the Mind at Rule 3 where Descartes 
made his famous distinction between intuition and deduction he had, amongst other 
things, argued that a crucial difference between the two was that, in a deduction, there 
is always a number of steps involved and the chances of error are greater because the 
person has to remember the various steps as the argument proceeds, even though at 
the time each step is taken it is actually intuited (i.e. C+D1). Commenting on the 
overall view he has of such deductions Descartes wrote: ‘deduction in a sense gets its 
certainty from memory’.39 If this picture is right, then it does seem to follow that as 
one moves through an argument the earlier steps even if they were perceived in the 
C+D1 sense when originally taken are being recalled or remembered at subsequent 
steps and thus fit the description Descartes uses for pieces of C+D2 perception.  
 
Earlier in Rule 3 Descartes had given an example of such a deductive argument and it 
is instructive to look at it. The argument runs as follows: (Step 1) 2+2=4;(Step 2) 
3+1=4; (Conclusion) hence 2+2 = 3+1.40 Applying his view of deduction to this 
argument it follows that, at the outset, the claim 2+2=4 is intuited and has C+D1 
status, however at step two that claim is now being remembered and has only got 
C+D2 status. Now if that is true in the case of such a simple argument, surely it is a 
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fortiori so when it comes to the moves which take place internal to the much more 
complex argument Descartes used to prove God’s existence in Meditation 3. Thus not 
only am I not just being captious in suggesting as much – I am taking the line 
Descartes took about a much simpler piece of reasoning. Thus, once again, it follows 
that the proof of God is in trouble and that the trouble it is in is that it makes us of a 
kind of C+D which it was intended to vindicate. 
 
6. A final card? 
 
Has Descartes anything to say which might stop my objection in its tracks? Well, he 
has one final card to play. If we look at Descartes’s discussion with Burman, we can 
see that one of the issues raised there concerns the number of items which a person 
can hold before his mind at any moment in time. The topic of direct and explicit 
attention to an item is central to the exchange between Descartes and Burman. What 
Burman had to say anticipates a central feature of my objection: ‘But our mind can 
think of only one thing at a time, whereas the proof in question is a fairly long one 
involving several axioms…So one will not be able to keep the attention on all the 
axioms since one thought will get in the way of another.’41
 
Descartes, always quick on his feet, responded as follows: ‘It is not true that the mind 
can think of only one thing at a time. It is true that it cannot think of a large number of 
things at the same time – but it can still think of more than one thing.’42 Descartes 
went on to give an example of what he had in mind: ‘I am now aware and have the 
thought that I am talking and that I am eating’.43 He then went on to apply all of this 
to the issue of the proof of God’s existence: ‘…since our thought is able to grasp more 
than one item in this way, it is clear that we are able to grasp the proof of God’s 
existence in its entirety.’44  Presumably what Descartes had in mind was that if we 
attend to it sufficiently carefully and attentively, and run over it often enough, we 
should be able to grasp the entire proof of God in a single, direct intuition thus 
removing any possible thought that any element of C+D2 perception is involved: in 
such a scenario the entire proof would be grasped as a single piece of C+D1. 
 
This is a typically Cartesian move but I have to say that it strikes me as an implausible 
suggestion. Once again the issue turns on the vast difference between the simple 
example Descartes has given of two things we can think of at the same time, and the 
demands which thinking at the same time of all the complex components of the 
complete proof would involve. Sure, I can easily think that I am eating and that I am 
talking at the same time, but is it plausible to export that conclusion to the case in 
which what I’m supposed to be thinking at the same time is the complex proof of God 
set out in five steps earlier? In my opinion that is not a plausible claim to make. 
 
One last comment on this final move by Descartes. Suppose we allow, for the sake of 
the argument, that a person could, over time, become so familiar with the proof of 
God that the whole proof could be grasped in a single complex thought, would that 
help Descartes in dealing with the circle? I do not think so because in the Meditations 
Descartes saw himself as moving forward philosophically in a particular way. He 
presented his understanding of this way of proceeding succinctly in his replies to 
Mersenne: ‘The order consists simply in this. The items which are put forward first 
must be known entirely without the aid of what comes later…I did try to follow this 
order carefully in my Meditations.’45 Now, if in order to achieve the desired C+D1 
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status for the various elements in the proof of God, one had to run over those elements 
a number of times, familiarise oneself with them, and then grasp the proof as a whole, 
such a procedure would conflict with Descartes’s overall understanding of the 
strategy at work in the Meditations. For the proof in Meditation 3 to do the trick for 
Descartes it has to work the first time – and he has to know that it works. If it doesn’t 
work the first time, then God does not emerge at all at that point and the whole 
enterprise fails. My objection is that this is just what happens and that it happens 
because a C+D2 turns up in the first statement of the proof before Descartes has any 
entitlement to it. Without reliance on that crucial piece of C+D2 the proof could not 
continue, and Descartes has no warrant for such reliance at that point. There is no 
point in talking of running over it all several times, so I think the final card Descartes 
plays does not win the trick. 
 
Thus, I am inclined to agree with David Hume: ‘The Cartesian doubt…were it ever 
possible to be attained by any creature …would be entirely incurable…To have 
recourse to the veracity of the Supreme Being …is surely making a very unexpected 
circuit.’46 No doubt Montaigne would suggest that the final word in that passage 
should be ‘circle’. 
 
Harry McCauley, Faculty of Philosophy, NUIM. 
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